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DÉBUT
T o speak about the future is almost impossible. To speak about the future in politics is flatly impossible. An essay with the above title, 
therefore, is nothing more than an act of hybris. And 
yet, to arrive somewhere one needs to plan where to 
go and how to get there. Therefore, I think that the 
idea of the Centre for Political Thought in Krakow to 
ask European intellectuals with a conservative bias 
to offer their views of the prospects of conservatism 
as a political ideal and as a practical political reality is 
legitimate. This essay is meant to address some of the 
questions posed by the Centre.
The title of the present essay is not meant to claim 
that this paper can describe the future of Europe and 
the role conservatives can play in it. It is not more 
than a draft drawn from an individual perspective – 
from the perspective of a Central-European academic 
educated in the history of political thought and 
political philosophy – on the challenges facing Europe 
and the possibilities opened up by these challenges 
for conservatism. 
It consists of three parts. First, it lists some of the 
most important recent events in global politics that 
might have an effect on the future of Europe. This 
enumeration, though recalling well-known facts, is 
necessary because we shall surely miss our target 
if we cannot define correctly our present location. 
Second, it will take note of some of the existing 
answers offered by political powers associated 
with conservatism on these challenges. Finally, it 
will provide its own proposals of how to confront 
these challenges according to the best – British-
style, Aristotelian and republican - conservative 
standards. 
IS CONSERVATISM STILL ALIVE?
B ut before all else, let us first think about the question whether conservatism is still a valid notion of/in politics today? There are 
radical views which hold that all the modern political 
ideologies are dead by now. After all, we are living 
in a postmodern age, in media-democracies, where 
popular choices are made following rather pragmatic 
considerations of popularity; and, therefore, all the 
value-laden theoretical presuppositions are no more 
than simple ballasts for the actual political agents in 
the day-to-day business of making politics. 
This essay does not share these sceptical, sometimes 
even cynical worries. Political ideologies are not meant 
to hog-tie politicians in order to hibernate political 
action. Marx claimed that ideas are dependent on 
existence, particularly on the existence of the particular 
agent. As John Lukacs so eloquently wrote, ideas in fact 
have the function to facilitate political action. Lukacs 
argued that the causal link is 
missed by Marx: we can only 
do whatever is opened up 
for us by our way of thinking. 
Ideas work for actions as the 
track for the locomotive: the 
latter cannot move but in the 
direction determined by the 
former. In other words our 
ways of thinking mark off the 
horizon of our imagination, 
which on its part determines 
our particular decisions in individual cases. We surely will 
not do what we do not imagine as doable. 
If we accept that ideologies are still important 
parts of the repertoire of politics today, there is a 
further question: is conservatism still among the 
relevant political ideologies? One of the possible 
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ways to discredit it is to stress that conservatism 
is a retroactive kind of ideology, which aims to 
keep under control the effects of another ideology, 
namely progressive liberalism. What if liberalism is 
not a risk today and, therefore, there is no need for a 
counterbalance? A further counterargument may ask 
whether it is logically possible to expect a future for 
an ideology that turns away already from the present 
and has more interest in the past than in anything 
else. And finally, why should we regard conservatism 
as still a viable alternative in the age of mass 
democracy and populist politics, when conservatism 
– as we learnt it at school – is an elitist ideology of 
nostalgia and gentlemanly behaviour?
This essay does not deny the force of these dilemmas. 
However, it claims that all of them rest on a rather 
naïve, simplified interpretation of conservatism. This 
essay would like to offer an alternative reading of the 
main characteristics of this ideology. It aims to show 
that it is not liable to the above criticisms and that we 
can associate it with our European future.
‘EARTHQUAKES’ OF THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM
T he new millennium surprised the world with a number of political earthquakes. No doubt the first globally important point was 11 September. 
With the fall of the twin-towers, Americans lost 
their granite-hard conviction that the US, the only 
superpower of the new millennium and the safeguard 
of global peace, is itself vulnerable. With it the whole 
world lost its belief of a stable world-order, controlled 
by the superpower whose main ideology was and 
remained ever since that of defending freedom 
globally. With the loss of these two beliefs, we entered 
a new age of universal uncertainties and irregularities.
A second blow of our global political comfort zone 
was the financial crisis of the late 2000s. Once again 
starting out from the US, it shook trust in a stable 
world and eliminated our expectations that the basis 
of global economy is itself rock-solid. 
This was a kind of dramatic overture of the new 
millennium. And yet it was not yet over, even if 
leading Western powers were able to momentarily 
calm down passions raised by these two earthquakes 
among their populaces and on the markets. 
The second wave of challenges was perhaps even 
more devastating than the first one. It also consisted 
of two steps. The first one was the exit vote from the 
EU by the majority of British voters, which exercised 
an unprecedented blow on the European project. And 
we cannot see as yet the end of the tunnel. So far it is 
surely the loudest criticism of the failures of European 
policy-makers to reach out and address voters in a 
convincing way. But the effects of Brexit were doubled 
by a further surprise within Western politics. American 
voters proved their determinacy and, in spite of the 
tremendous campaign of the mainstream media and 
the intellectuals of progressive university campuses 
against him, they elected Trump as president in 2017. 
Brexit and Trump’s presidency got interpreted 
together, and this brought about a landslide within 
Western public discourse. Why? Well, earlier both of 
these facts lay outside of the terrain of what people 
thought was politically possible or even imaginable. 
In a way the two choices – both of them the decisions 
of the electorate, and, therefore, the legitimacy of 
them unquestionable – opened up political discourse 
and political action before what was earlier hardly 
feasible. This way they signalled the end of an era and 




I n one reading of the story, this turn is a conservative revolution. In another one it results in the phenomenon that is ridiculed by its opponents 
as ‘populism’. Left-liberals make all efforts to discredit 
the winners of this new trend. Labelling it as populism, 
they try to delegitimize these moves. It is perhaps 
more surprising that for a part of conservative-
minded voters and members of the conservative elite, 
these shocking moves also represent a rather gloomy 
prospect for what they had known as conservatism 
earlier. To turn away from Europe in Britain or from 
the standards of mainstream professional politics 
in America is not something conservatives would 
have identified earlier as part of the conservative 
identity. Some of them feel it is in fact a corruption of 
conservative principles. 
European conservatives are certainly saturated by 
what is called European culture, and, therefore, they 
try to defend a culture-based notion of conservatism, 
though the Brexit-vote and Trump’s victory both 
signal the takeover of a plebeian conservatism that 
targets the less educated part of the conservative 
electorate. This is a fatal conceit on the part of 
populist conservatives. According to the premises 
of the conservatism this paper calls for, there is no 
future, and particularly no conservative future without 
concentrating huge powers on the education of our 
children. 
And again, most American conservatives are not 
ready to give up their self-perception as opposing 
personality-cults and the sort of voluntarism which 
is fuelled by animosities and violent passions 
instead of the practical common sense one gets 
from practical experience and from learning how 
to take responsibility for others, in accordance with 
local habits and general customs of the political 
culture of one’s community. They do not believe in 
turning things upside-down without hesitation, as 
revolutionary politicians used to do. 
To understand the present moment and the real 
urgency of it, one needs to recall that Brexit and the 
Trump-phenomenon are still not the whole story. 
The new situation we confront is greatly determined 
by the migrant crisis of Europe. This is an issue that 
directly belongs on the conservative agenda. 
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THE KEYS OF THE FUTURE: 
MIGRATION AND DEMOGRAPHY
M igration is not a new phenomenon in Europe. The continent has been open to recurring waves of invaders for thousand 
years. However, since the Turkish invasion in the 
early modern period, there was no experience of a 
massive incursion that threatened the existing system 
of states. This is only true, of course, if we take the 
Russian invasion of Eastern Europe as done by a 
European superpower and not by an external force. 
The new flux has been building for years by now, but 
a breakthrough happened in 2015 when the number 
of illegal migrants jumped to an unprecedented 
level. And if the news is true, millions of migrants are 
already waiting to cross the Mediterranean and enter 
European borders, legally and illegally. 
European states as well as EU institutions were rather 
slow to react to the new pressure on their borders 
from the south and the east and to understand the 
stakes. The two countries in the centre of the siege 
were Italy and Greece, and both countries were near 
to state bankruptcy. Germany was keen to strengthen 
its own position, and the Greeks also had their share 
in the financial aspect of the growing crisis. 
Although Merkel could negotiate a pact with Turkey, 
by now the whole European public sphere was 
dominated by the discussion about the migration 
issue. Once again the left and the right were 
radically divided in their answers to it, and once 
again the political elites of the eastern and the 
western part of the continent react differently. Until 
the EU could make a long-term deal with the Turks, 
there was a constant fear of a breakthrough. The 
Italians introduced a stricter border regime, and 
the countries on the migration route built out their 
legal and physical barricades. In spite of all these 
measures, for months large crowds of uncontrolled 
migrant groups travelled across Europe, causing 
an exceptionally loud safety-alarm among the 
populace.  
Germany’s Angela Merkel was a key proponent of 
what was called Willkommenskultur, a policy of liberal 
migration-regime. The policy let people in if they 
claimed to have arrived from countries where their 
life could have been directly at risk according to the 
protocol of the EU or the UN. She was supported by 
the liberally dominated German media and by the 
majority of European public intellectuals, while a lot 
of the electorate, fuelled by radical and ‘populist’ 
political powers, became frustrated by the situation. 
Their frustration caused a remarkable shift in the 
voting tendencies in Europe and for a time also in 
Germany. Merkel succeeded to pacify her camp, and 
she is back in popularity with a strategy to calm down 
passions about the migration issue.
Although there is a momentary rest in the migration 
crisis, it still remains a time bomb, which needs to be 
directly tackled, like by a common European policy 
of humanitarian intervention, border policy and 
the rise of the defence and security capacities on a 
European as well as national level, if we want to avoid 
catastrophe. Conservatives should remind mainstream 
politics of the inherent dangers of the situation and 
returning to the issue that is of primary importance 
for the future of Europe. However, they should also 
avoid harsh, awe-inspiring and hectoring rhetoric. All 
in all the migration crisis is an unprecedented political 
burden on Europe, which is experiencing once again 
a political crisis as a result of it. But in times of crisis, 
calm heads and clear words are a must.
A further strategic point connected to the migration 
issue is, of course, the declining demographic trends 
in the population figures of most European countries. 
This makes the external threat the more provocative 
and harder to resist. There is no space here to go into 
details about this long-range problem, but it needs to 
be clearly stated that there is no satisfactory solution 
to the migration crisis without European nations once 
again recovering their demographic potential. 
CENTRAL EUROPE  
IN THE CENTRE
A further development of the migration issue and the unexpected Brexit vote is the strengthening of the power and voice of the V4 countries, 
the elite of the eastern European bloc earlier under 
Soviet occupation. The V4 is now a power-group 
representing the political interests of its member 
states in the European orchestra. The organisational 
framework of the V4 countries was for long simply a 
formal arrangement without political substance. But 
after Brexit and as a result of the migration crisis, there 
is a lacuna in European politics: the dissenting voice of 
the Euro-realists, who do not accept the tacit European 
agreement of being kind and very humanitarian to 
external forces and strictly adhering to the liberal jargon 
of political correctness internally. The role of the bad boy 
can be filled in by the coalition of the V4 countries, who 
have a wholly different experimental horizon than most 
members of the Western elites, for they have a rather 
serious inferiority complex due to the historical traumas 
caused and suffered by their countries. 
Although all the four partners of the V4 countries 
are independent players with their own European 
strategies, in all of them a hard-line policy against 
illegal migration seems to promise very good 
returns in electoral votes. This is obvious from 
the fact that independently of the colour of the 
government, in all four of these countries we find 
a version of this hard-liner position pursued. One 
should also note, that this hard-line position is 
echoed among the electorate of some Western 
European countries, which makes the issue the 
more sensitive, as Western politicians might become 
frightened by the prospect of a coalition between 
VF political elites and a wider European electorate. 
All in all, the strengthening presence of Central 
Europe for the moment causes more dilemmas than 
it solves. This means that Europe needs to tackle the 
issue rather soon if it hopes for a viable strategy for 
survival. Otherwise a division of Europe along the 
earlier iron curtain is still a realistic option. However, 
a tough power-policy of sanctioning culprits might 
not be fruitful, as it can turn out counter-productive 
among the voters. Germany and France, however, 
started a tactical game of divide et impera, which 
might bring its fruits. 
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THE RUSSIAN LEADER AS A 
TRADITIONALIST CELEBRITY
A nd now that we had a look at the major political issues that divide Europe and impact its policies, let us see how European 
conservatives react on the issue. This paper has 
no chance to give a full account of the different 
conservative forces in Europe. Instead of that 
enumeration, it picks out two paradigmatic ways 
of reaction. It needs to be premised that from the 
perspective of the present paper, neither of the two 
seem to be too promising, as both of them seem to 
disregard traditional conservative values. In any case, 
both of them represent a rather strong provocation 
against the ruling political style in Europe. And both 
of them come from the earlier Soviet bloc part of 
Europe, which leads to a conclusion that if Europe 
wants a long-standing solution, there is a need for the 
pacification of this periphery.
The first reaction to the new crises of Europe among 
conservatives is a kind of ‘authoritarian or Eastern 
turn’. According to the narrative that propagates 
this solution, the European identity is in an awful 
condition: the European intelligentsia, including the 
political elite, has forgotten the traditional European 
values of marriage, family, patria and religion. To 
heal this loss and to regain identity, inspiration can 
come from the East, where all these values are still 
highly appreciated. A key figure in this regard is the 
Russian president, Vladimir Putin. Partly by his own 
political talent, partly due to the very successful 
activity of the Russian secret agencies and the official 
Russian state-media, the Russian president is highly 
appreciated among European Conservatives. Wiping 
out of his fans’ memory of his rather uncomfortable 
KGB-past, Putin poses now as the only Christian ruler 
of Europe, the defender of religion and conservative 
values, a real hero and Christian knight and the last 
representative of traditionalism in Europe. 
Obviously, this is a constructed image that has 
nothing to do with historical reality, and yet he is 
quite popular among his own voters as well as among 
many Europeans. Believers in the Putin-model would 
return to an earlier, interwar example of leadership 
in Central-Europe, like that of Piłsudski and Horthy 
in Poland and Hungary respectively. To manipulate 
public perception, the migration issue provides 
opportunity for politicians to show their heroic quality. 
After all, the authoritarian model of conservatism is 
based on the assumption that a heroic leader will be 
followed by its fans, irrespective of particular wrong 
decisions he or she might have made time after time.
THE POPULIST TURN
T he second reaction of conservatives to the dilemmas of the day is the ‘populist turn’. While conservatism used to be elite-oriented and 
refused to accept even the ideas of democracy and 
egalitarianism, the new trend among conservatives is 
to win over the majoritarian principle of democracy 
and to run for the majority. Given the fact that there 
is a democratic deficit in Western Europe in the 
relationship called the ‘Brussels bureaucracy’ and the 
European citizenry, and most Western leaders are 
too comfortable to fight for majorities, conservative 
leaders are right to sense a chance to win the 
populace for their causes. 
This aim is made easier to achieve by the different 
technological innovations of the digital age. Politically 
alert media-messages can easily reach and directly 
address not only social groups but individuals 
outside of the realm of mainstream media too. As 
a consequence, it is possible for leaders who have 
been discredited by the media elite and the circle 
of politically active public intellectuals to avoid their 
influence. Instead they can rely on a door-to-door 
campaign to turn directly to the electorate. As a 
result, a new generation of conservative politicians 
have an unprecedented popularity among politically 
active citizens due to the fact of their direct approach 
and their decision to quit earlier tacit agreements, 
including the hypocrisy of political correctness. 
Their success is also due to a technique of negative 
campaigning, which results in a loss of trust among 
the populace in the power holders of the European 
status quo. This gives an opportunity for outsiders 
to enter the political stage. There is, therefore, 
widespread fear in the European political and 
media-elites that the newcomers can take over their 
positions.
THE RETURN TO 
COMMON SENSE
A lthough authoritarian and populist tendencies promise some success, this paper wants to argue that conservatives should not rely on 
them to win in the political competition. Although 
conservatism at its best is never doctrinaire, one 
cannot envisage a powerful conservative renaissance 
without firm grounds in established values and 
accepted ways of political behaviour. Neither 
an authoritarian nor a populist kind of politics 
promises to provide these grounds. While populism 
is explicitly denying the importance of such value-
presuppositions, the authoritarian trend simply 
sacrifices European-style constitutional and rule-of-
law traditions in order to build up a working regime of 
effective centralised government. 
There are those who claim that there is no alternative 
but these harsh measures if we want to overcome the 
non-realistic left-liberal elites, causing real problems 
in Europe since their takeover in the after-1968 
political climate. They are pushing societies towards 
unnatural targets, so there is good reason to get rid 
of their dominance in politics, the media and in the 
academic world whatever the means. This paper will 
argue, however, that there is an alternative solution to 
tackle the issue: a more modest, less overwhelming 
way that, however, allows us to preserve the values 
conservatives cherish while helping us to win the case.
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COMMON SENSE VERSUS  
ALT-RIGHT AND POLITICAL 
REALIST CONSERVATISM
T he type of conservatism this paper promotes as the alternative is a common sense, republican kind of conservatism. In the last bit of the 
paper, therefore, we need to elaborate these two 
concepts: what does the adjective common sense and 
republican stand for here?
Let us start with the idea of common sense. In order 
to explain it this paper distinguishes it from two other 
types of conservatism. Common sense conservatism 
should be distinguished first of all from the ideological 
fundamentalist type of conservatism, covered 
in recent years by the alt-right in the US. Their 
provocative and outrageous ideas are regarded by 
common sense conservatives as neither conceptually 
verifiable nor sustainable on the long run. On the 
contrary, they regard the aggressive negative 
campaign used by the alt-right as purely a marketing 
strategy, which has its raison d’être in campaign time, 
but they cannot provide the theoretical foundations 
for conservatism. 
A second distinction concerns the sort of political 
realism that is usually associated with the 
representatives of the American neoconservative 
movement. The neocons, as they are usually labelled, 
went through a political transformation, leaving the 
camp of the non-Stalinist left in order to join the 
camp of American conservatism. Most of them relied 
on the sometimes non-explicit political teachings 
of their father figure, Leo Strauss, a German-Jewish 
philosopher of the first rank, who emigrated to the 
US in 1937 to escape Hitler’s anti-Semitic policy. He 
taught at the New School in Manhattan, New York, 
and later at the University of Chicago, exercising a 
tremendous influence, especially among New York 
based Jewish intellectuals, and winning them over to 
the case of conservatism. 
The neocons had a very explicit foreign policy, 
and were theoretically most active in international 
relations during the presidency of G. W. Bush, striving 
both practically and theoretically for what can be 
regarded as American exceptionalism, a kind of global 
leadership towards the realm of absolute human 
rights. They were the most keen to encourage the 
intervention in Iraq.
Apparently neoconservative ideology has its admirers 
in Central Europe as well. András Lánczi, for example, 
one of the former advisers of Viktor Orbán, is a 
researcher and admirer of Leo Strauss. Another 
ideologist of right wing politics in Hungary is Gábor 
G. Fodor, whose pronouncements, like the one he 
apparently took from the 17th century prelate Cardinal 
de Retz (‘There is nothing in this world that does 
not have a decisive moment and the masterpiece 
of good ruling is to know and seize this moment’) 
or the famous slogan of ‘civic Hungary’ (polgári 
Magyarország) are simply political products that 
sound like an adoption of neocon slogans. They never 
fail to stir up emotions and resentment even within 
the conservative camp. These neocon ideologists 
might be behind the main policy line of Orbán’s 2017 
Kötcse-speech, arguing for an activist foreign policy 
and economic strategy for Hungary and targeting an 
ideal of Hungary growing into the role of a ‘middle 
state’, a term which is rather difficult to make sense of. 
If alt-right and neocon influences are visible in 
Central Europe today (and I do not venture to make 
any pronouncements about the ideological backing 
behind the present Polish government of Beata 
Szydło), this paper would present its common sense 
conservatism as an alternative of that direction. 
Although the President Trump has already in his 
Republican campaign called himself a common sense 
conservative, clearly it is a notion that cannot easily 
be associated with the Trump regime. On the contrary, 
it is mostly associated with the old Whig statesman, 
founder of modern conservatism, Edmund Burke, 
who held that one of the greatest political virtues 
is to moderate one’s passion and try to listen to the 
advice of common sense, or recta ratio, understood 
in accordance with Cicero as human rationality in 
harmony with nature. 
The common sense conservative is not taking the 
elitist route of the intellectual conservative. She 
is happy to keep both conservatism’s language 
and logic on the level of ordinary people without 
becoming ‘populist’, i.e. giving in to, or even less, 
relying on popular political passions. It is realist 
in the sense of not trying to imitate leftist politics 
by destroying social frameworks and building 
monuments instead of useful architecture. It tries 
to solve the everyday problems of everyday people, 
listening to the complaints of the voters and 
addressing particular local contexts instead of the 
whole of the populace. It does not want to destroy 
its enemies, and it does not rely, therefore, on a 
culture war ‘psychosis’ but concentrates on internal 
politics. In foreign policy issues, it is not naïve, but 
it is not dreaming about ‘grandeur’. Rather it tries 
to be more like a fox, and only in rare moments 
does it attempt to imitate the lion. All in all, this is 
a conception of the statesman’s role, which is more 
modest and relies more heavily on what is called 
in the Aristotelian tradition political prudence, the 
wisdom of the ruler to act in accordance with the 
demands of the moment without giving up one’s 
basic principles and highest values. 
The common sense politician is by definition closer to 
everyday reality and the common voters than most of 
his political competitors, particularly the doctrinaire 
liberals and the fundamentalist conservatives. He 
relies more heavily on the political contribution of 
the citizens than the believers of representative 
democracy would expect. In this sense common 




T he political philosophy of republicanism became quite trendy a few decades ago, and it was mainly advocated by 
leftist intellectuals as a kind of criticism of the 
individualist liberal framework of authors, like 
Rawls and Dworkin. As opposed to the main ideas 
of people like Skinner and Pettit, conservative 
republicanism proposes to build conservatism on 
the actual experiences of smaller social units that 
work well, especially on the traditional governance 
of European towns. 
Urban republicanism is a living tradition in Europe, 
which worked as an incubator of large-scale political 
structures, like states, in the early modern period. 
Cities were quite useful for would be politicians to 
test their abilities, and learn in practice rather than in 
theory the skills of the profession. City governance 
was not possible without a larger portion of the 
citizenry getting actively involved in running the 
city. In this way, cities were much more experienced 
in how to regulate their populace by means of the 
procedurally circumscribed regulations of that very 
populace than any other forms – think about the 
republicanism of Kant, who was a longstanding 
admirer of republics and a devoted citizen of his 
native town, Königsberg. 
Unfortunately, while the theory of the modern 
state has been delineated by great authors in very 
detailed treatises over a long period of time, theories 
of the city were less fashionable, as sponsors were 
lacking for a long time. By the time the academic 
disciplines of the theory of the state, government 
or political science were established, the level of the 
state was taken as the standard scale for political 
theory. Although there were influential theories of 
self-governance (think about Tocqueville) and in the 
modern framework of state administration, cities 
needed their local office-holders, who required proper 
materials to learn. Not much energy was lost to think 
about it in a systematic fashion. 
48 49New Direction - The Foundation for European Reform www.europeanreform.org     @europeanreform
Ferenc HörcherTHE FUTURE OF CONSERVATIVE POLITICS IN EUROPE – A CENTRAL-EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
Even more significantly, conservatives were usually 
less enthusiastic about cities, claiming that their 
supporters tend to reside in rural areas, while big 
cities are by definition politically progressive in 
their political climate. While sometimes even this 
generalisation might be challenged, the point this 
paper wants to make is that conservatism as a 
theoretical enterprise and also as a political reality 
should concentrate on the scale of the political 
community of the city. This choice is confirmed by the 
fact that neoliberalism tends to turn public discourse 
towards the realm of supranational institutions, global 
networks and global justice in general. If the state is 
taken over by populist pragmatists, and at the supra-
national level by Brussels bureaucrats, global firms 
and neoliberal ideology, conservatives have a natural 
choice to concentrate their efforts on the level of the 
city, which can be won one after the other, without 
the need to overinvest into the struggle. This is, at 
least, the message conservative republicans want to 
spread.
CONCLUSION: A PLEA FOR A 
COMMON SENSE, REPUBLICAN 
CONSERVATISM
A s we saw in this paper, Europe and the West in general are experiencing a shocking line of political crises and explosions in the 
21st century. September 11, the financial crisis, the 
Brexit vote, the unexpected election of Trump to 
presidency, the migration crisis and the rise of the 
V4 countries each individually could have a major 
impact on a Europe that is politically not really in full 
swing.  Obviously, the European political infrastructure 
did not react properly to this fusion of crises, and, 
therefore, Europe as a political force is constantly 
and very rapidly losing its weight and authority in the 
world. 
This paper wanted to argue that although some 
sort of gain has been realised from the dysfunction 
of the European institutions, mainly in Central 
European conservative politics, the sort of 
conservatism that could capitalise on it is not yet on 
stage. The paper pointed at two conservative types 
that can bring momentary success but no long-term 
breakthrough: conservatism with an authoritarian 
bent and populist conservatism. Both of them, 
or a combination of them might be performing 
quite well in the political competition of a chaotic 
present, however, great prices have to be paid for 
that. No doubt, the label conservative was dropped 
by some of these leaders because they realised that 
major conservative values had to be sacrificed on 
the altar of electoral efficiency. 
This paper, therefore, presents an alternative 
version of conservatism based on two traditional 
values: a common sense approach to politics and 
republicanism, meaning in this case not more 
than a participatory vision of political community. 
The main thesis of the paper is that a common 
sense approach is viable even in this critical 
moment, and it claims that it can avoid the pitfalls 
of giving up basic values (like political realism 
does) or of becoming doctrinaire (like a radically 
ideological type of alt-right conservatism does). 
On the other hand, the republican element of this 
conservatism means an encouragement of the 
active participation of the citizenry, to raise the 
legitimacy of conservatism by the democratic 
principle. This participatory model is based on 
the long-standing tradition of the governance 
of European cities, which were the incubators of 
democratic policy-making. According to the model 
proposed, conservatism can manage to remain 
close to common sense and encourage active 
participation and a political culture of responsible 
governance. This way, it is argued, conservatism 
can remain up-to-date and yet loyal to its 
venerable tradition.   •
50 51New Direction - The Foundation for European Reform www.europeanreform.org     @europeanreform





Corvinus University, Budapest, Center of Social Sciences, 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
6
T he right/left scale is an old toolkit by which political philosophies are introduced to freshmen at universities. There is nothing 
generally wrong with it. Moreover, it combines 
two ideas in a felicitous way, namely, the idea of 
comparing particular political philosophies to one 
another in terms of their content (what constitutes 
leftist and rightist thinking) and the idea of intensity 
(radical/moderate politics). Evidently, party programs 
and ideologies do not necessarily correspond to 
political philosophies, yet the latter are its intellectual 
sources. 
On the scale, conservatism has usually been 
considered to be a rightist political philosophy, closer 
to the center than radical rightist ideologies. On the 
far left, Marxism and other socialist philosophies have 
been placed, whereas liberalism has been interpreted 
as being closer to the center, near to conservatism. 
Now there is nothing generally wrong with this 
textbook presentation. However, contemporary 
political debates and struggles suggest that a 
significant shift of balance has occurred. Liberalism 
has become dominated and permeated by an extreme 
sort of absolutist egalitarianism to the extent that 
it has almost completely abandoned its core ideas, 
its commitment to protecting private and public 
liberty and to the tradition of moderate governing. 
In fact, absolutist egalitarianism is on the march to 
occupy and conquer conservatism as well. The former 
construction of a balance consisting of two extreme 
and two moderate forces appears to be on the verge 
of falling. At the same time, we are also witnessing a 
resurgence of ideological thinking on both sides of the 
scale, and the growing radicalization of politics, which 
means that extreme thinking and practice begins, 
18 I am indebted to John Kekes and to his A Case for Conservatism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001) for his lucid argumentation. He places 
conservatism in between pairs of extreme attitudinal-philosophical positions, an approach this essay has much in common with.
once again in modern Western history, to exert an 
unruly influence on the center.
Classical conservatism is the archenemy of political 
radicalism of any sort. I do not think there is any 
cogent reason for conservatives to abandon this 
conviction, which, on the one hand, secures its 
position in the center and, on the other hand, helps 
it to resist ideological absolutism. Since liberalism 
seems to have denied its classical, moderate 
traditions and succumbed to ideological absolutism, 
conservatism has now to bear the extraordinary 
political responsibility of sustaining moral realism, 
political sobriety and moderate government in the 
center. Since it has been traditionally hostile to 
political ideologies and ‘isms’ in general, it has the 
potential, flexibility and credibility to take on this 
responsibility. Since it rests on solid philosophical 
grounds on the basic truths about human nature 
and society, and since it possesses enormous critical 
resources to reject radical, simplifying, utopian 
and absolutist thinking (leftist and rightist alike), 
conservatism has and is able to fulfill a critical role in 
political thinking and practice today.18
In what follows, I shall enlarge on this thesis by 
citing and briefly analyzing what appear to me some 
major ideological struggles today fought in terms 
of absolutist conceptions having radical political 
consequences. There is no assumption here in terms 
of priorities, and it goes without saying that there 
will be overlaps between the various arguments. 
Nonetheless, they are distinct or can be rendered 
meaningful without explicitly invoking the others. Out 
of each brief analysis, there will emerge a constructive 
conservative point. 
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CONSCIENCE
19 Schmitt, Carl. The Tyranny of Values. Translated and edited by Simona Draghici. Washington, DC: Plutarch Press, 1996.
20 For the Kantian dilemma, see Korsgaard, Christine: The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
21 Derek Parfit, arguably one of the greatest synthetic minds in contemporary moral theory, proposed that Kantianism, Utilitarianism and Contractualism are 
unifiable and that there is a single last principle of all ethical theories: On What Matters, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 2017.
C ontemporary liberalism has been rapidly moving toward what Carl Schmitt once called the tyranny of values.19 In many leading 
liberal journals on ethics and moral philosophy, a 
vast portion of discussion has increasingly been 
either on subtleties of justice, equality, respect and 
human rights (liberty or freedom, the root concept 
of liberalism, is usually a terrain of republicanism 
today), or on the search for the ultimate principle. 
Though Kantianism flourishes, disagreements are 
mostly on whether it is the Categorical Imperative 
or the Universal Respect for Persons that is the truly 
ultimate principle.20 Act Utilitarianism is replaced by 
Rule Utilitarianism and other kinds of contractualist, 
rational-choice based ethics that are similarly zealous 
about their search for the ultimate principle or value.21 
What is more, even virtue ethics has been absorbed 
and duly digested by liberal theorists. Almost 
invariably, discussions of particular virtues end up 
being interpreted in a way that they are shown to be 
reducible to equality, respect or the absolute worth of 
human persons. 
At the other extreme we find relativists, genealogists 
and all sorts of post-Nietzschean skeptics who do not 
deny the social importance of values or a belief in 
them, but they constantly remind us of their historical 
and cultural contingency. And as is often the case with 
extremes, they can forge political alliances. On the 
one hand, fervent believers in equality or respect, for 
instance, may share the skepticism of relativists and 
deny the objective nature of values, lest they need 
to defend the primacy of their own chosen value. 
Some would argue further that there is a human and 
personal need for faith and strong beliefs. Working 
and fighting for social justice, for instance, may be a 
personal choice, a form of political activism, a way of 
self-fulfillment. On the other hand, hardcore relativists 
may doubt the absolute value of respect, for instance, 
and yet be jealously defending the universal right of 
doubt and argue that this is in what respect consists. 
Such apparently inconsistent argumentations are 
not infrequent. Relativist absolutists and absolutist 
relativists have much in common. 
Conservatives need to face both challenges and 
point out such inconsistencies. But they can also 
make a constructive step as well by recalling and 
re-invoking the old and practically forgotten concept 
and a real component of the human nature: this is 
conscience. Conservatives can and should point 
out that no value or principle can be declared to 
be absolute by philosophy. Moral philosophical 
speculations themselves have only limited value. 
Much of morality is given and has been handed over 
to us in terms of explicit prohibitions and unwritten 
laws that are written in the human heart. This is not 
a mystery. Notwithstanding the changing nature of 
mores or of the Sitten, there are universal wrongs that 
conscience warns us of. There are and can be all sorts 
of mitigating circumstances, social preconditions, 
persistent bad habits and corrupt institutions which 
confuse conscience, yet we are free to resist them. 
An embracement of relativism and contingency, a 
belief in some freely chosen cause does not eliminate 
conscience. Nor do subjective and often erroneous 
speculations about how to impose a single value 
or principle over the conscience make it infallible. 
Conservatives need to stress the dignity of informed 
conscience that is independent both of historical and 
subjective contingencies. If conscience is truly taken 
seriously, it will speak in an audible and authoritative 
voice, which is now being suppressed by moral tyrants 
and moral anarchists alike. 
THE AUTHORITY OF MORALITY
22 Arguably, the most well known exponent of this view was Bernard Williams (for the locus classicus see his Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Fontana 
Books, London; Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1985). But he does not share the view that there is any objective moral order. The view that morality is not 
an absolute ruler of the human world (nor should it be) yet morality is an objective part of reality see the phenomenological ethics of Aurel Kolnai, another great 
conservative thinker.
C losely related to the tyranny of values is the liberal advocacy of morality over politics and possibly over all human affairs.22 After 
the devastating moral consequences of totalitarian 
ideologies of the 20th century, it is hardly surprising 
that many people concluded that morality should 
come first everywhere and always, especially 
in politics. The social and moral emancipation 
movements of the ’60s, the interpretation of the 
problems of the Third World as being caused by 
immorality and the successful revolutions against 
dictatorships brought about by civil and human rights 
movements produced a climate of global moralizing. 
Issues such as capitalism, inequality, environment 
protection, global warming, gender inequalities, 
intergenerational, international justice and so on 
are considered to be mostly ethical problems that 
politics need to address directly, for legislation needs 
to answer these challenges in the first place. This 
urgency is coupled with a general moral guilt culture, 
where guilt must be felt for all sorts of historical 
crimes (often starting from the Crusades) and for 
domination and exploitation of any kind. The priority 
of morality, conceived in these positive (values, 
principles, right causes) and negative (guilt) terms, 
is imposed upon universities and university policies, 
upon courts (including Constitutional and Supreme 
Courts), mass media, social media, churches, on the 
prevailing comme il faut political discourse and so on. 
In opposition to this we can also witness an increasing 
general skepticism over morality and the moral 
dimension of politics. Some of those who share this 
skeptical attitude point out the reality of power 
behind moralism. Others only sense and complain 
about the practical impossibility of talking in a 
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different tone and with a different conviction. Again, 
others take a positively power-centered position, 
arguing that there is no point in discoursing about 
discourses if implicit or explicit barriers, such as 
political correctness, filter out topics beyond the 
morality-first consensus. For instance, followers of 
the alternative right and identitarianism often take 
the strategy of provocation and other kinds of direct 
actions that unmask the realities of power. In a more 
radical form, some believe the news is nothing but 
manipulated, faked and dishonestly interpreted 
reports. They believe this entitles them to do the 
same. It is only power that counts, after all.
In the midst of such absolutist positions, conservatives 
need to be moral realists who admit the objective 
and authoritative nature of the moral order. But 
they must also deny that it needs and can be 
imposed on humanity and society in an absolutist 
way. Conservatives must be fully aware of the fact 
that moral authority in human hands is liable to be 
misused. 
First, the objectivity of the moral order is that man 
was created a moral animal, which means that our 
actions, decisions, emotions and even thoughts have 
a moral aspect and whatever we think, feel and do 
may be in need of moral justification. If our conscience 
is silent, it will be our fellowmen who demand 
justification. Morality cannot be ignored for long. 
Secondly, however, this is distinct from pan-moralism 
and its absolutist consequences. The moral aspect 
does not emerge as an always-overriding authority. 
Much of our lives consist of doing things that we 
consider generally good outside of a specifically 
moral sense. It does not occur very frequently that 
morality or the authority of morality commands us 
to do something. In fact, in probably most cases it 
commands us not to do something. The authority 
of morality is restrictive and prohibitive, rather than 
a prescriptive, goal-oriented agent. Liberals are 
right to emphasize that morality is important, but 
it is important mainly in this restrictive sense and 
within this restricted scope. Third, those who reject 
liberal moralism are right to point out that there is 
an aggressive power dimension often behind it; that 
liberalism has become (to the dismay of the handful 
remaining classical liberals) an ideology that enforces 
its moral ideals on behalf of the authority of morality 
upon politics, institutions, even private associations 
and persons. Conservatives know that since morality 
is real and stands on objective grounds, it does have a 
certain coercive aspect. This is why it can be misused, 
even abused in political discourse and action. Such 
abuses must be uncovered and resisted. However, 
no abuse of morality in the form of pan-moralism 
exempts us from the authority of morality, the moral 
order or from the validity of moral prohibitions 
entrenched in our culture or, as conservatives are 
bound to believe, grounded in human nature. 
LIBERTY
L eaving moral issues behind, liberals and other leftist thinkers are concerned, even worried about what they call autocratic and populist tendencies 
not only in some remote corners of the world, but 
within the core countries of Western democracies as 
well. The basic argument is simple: new autocracies 
or autocratic movements justify themselves in terms 
of democracy, but what they call democracy is really 
nothing but populism (anti-elitism, the rejection of 
institutions, the checks and balances, and the favoring 
of direct, immediate, acclamatory voting). Autocracies 
are non-democratic because democracy entails 
liberalism, constitutional constraints, separation of 
powers and so on. Those who oppose liberalism like to 
point out that democracy is by definition ‘populist’ and 
that when liberals defend democracy, it is their rule, 
rather than the interest of the people, that they want 
to preserve and protect. Democracy cannot and should 
not be constrained. 
Debates of this kind tend to be murky and unhelpful. 
Conservatives can offer a more honest and 
straightforward view of democracy because they 
interpret it in terms of history and culture, taking 
Alexis de Tocqueville’s insights about democracy 
seriously. On the one hand, they realize that populism 
as defined above has always been an organic part 
of any democracy. There is nothing new about 
the popularity of populism in crises. This has ever 
been the rule, rather than the exception, of most 
democracies. Conservatives can, once again, refer to 
human nature. There is absolutely nothing striking 
about our strong emotional reactions to grave 
crises. Among such reactions, fear, hatred, anguish, 
agitation, as well the desire for immediate action, 
strong leadership and grand visions are the most 
prominent ones. Populism as defined above is a result 
of a deep-rooted urge that something has to be 
done immediately. Since contemporary democracies 
operate on a rather short-term basis (elections are 
held quite often), since its basic principles include 
the universal suffrage and the equal weight of votes, 
and since modern states run by elected officials have 
competences and powers unprecedented in history, 
populism is an inevitable feature of any democracy. 
Democracies are naturally closer to autocratic rule 
than liberals would like to admit.
On the other hand, the reason why democracies are 
in need of restraining and disciplining is precisely 
because of such populist urges. Yet contrary to 
liberals, conservatives must and can point out that 
the constraints and limitations of democracy are what 
they are, namely, constraints and limitations. They 
can comfortably argue that history teaches us that 
democracy can be tyrannical and autocratic, against the 
interests and best intentions of its citizens, especially in 
absence of experience and self-imposed discipline. What 
is very often required is less and not more democracy. 
It is not impossible to argue forcefully and 
convincingly why and how less democracy serves the 
public interest. Conservatives can argue that it is both 
public and private liberty that is in need of protection 
against the unconstrained will of the changing 
majority. If liberals abandon the protection of freedom 
in favor of other values (see the introduction), then 
conservatives of today should undertake this job. They 
can point out that crises are natural parts of human 
history and that they can be overcome by wisdom 
and competence rather than by prophets and gurus; 
by patience and good governance rather than by 
will, pressure and passions; by social and political 
efforts concerted by institutions and routines rather 
than by visions and miracles; by virtuous, strong and 
determined people rather than by all-powerful, loud, 
dictatorial leaders. Prophets, visionaries, dictators, 
impatient masses, strong desires, agitation and such 
reactions not only may deepen crises, but they may 
also threaten public and private freedom.
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CIVILIZATION
O nce upon a time, much of the globe was dominated by empires embedded in the Atlantic civilization. These empires up to the 
Modern Age were transnational and transcultural, 
that is, having a dynasty, a public service and 
administration, usually an army and an intellectual 
elite that was committed to its own task within the 
empire, rarely making serious efforts to integrate 
these distinct parts into a unified and homogenous 
state, and much less aiming at forming and forging a 
single nation. Empires had religious legitimacy, some 
natural and rational justification (the common good), 
sometimes certain universal and missionary ideals, 
various professional codes of virtue, a hierarchy of 
partly hereditary social and political positions, and 
more or less institutionalized separation of powers. 
These empires were politically more abstract and 
rationalist than contemporary nations are, yet more 
concrete, distinctive and well shaped in terms of 
functions, social and political roles, ethics and even 
ethnicities. 
It is not suggested that these empires (the last one, 
the Danube monarchy was dissolved as late as in 
1918) were perfect. Nothing is perfect in this world, 
yet history does commend them as examples of 
sophisticated, efficient, enduring, yet non-tyrannical 
and moderate governing. 
After the decline of these empires and the rise of 
modern nation states (some of which began to abuse 
the concept of empire, as in the cases of the French and 
the German Empires), formerly separated functions, 
powers and competences were rapidly unified 
and nationalized. Natural hierarchies were largely 
abolished. Theological and rationalist legitimacy was 
replaced by emotions and subjectivist philosophies. 
Ideals became identity-based. The malaise of such 
nation states revealed first by and in the Great War to 
horrendous extents prompted liberals to proclaim a 
crusade against this development. Though liberals do 
not realize it, the abolishment of nation states has a 
very antimodernist and almost traditionalist inspiration: 
old empires are sometimes (romantically) cited as 
examples of tolerance and cultural openness (especially 
the emphatically non-Christian Hellenistic and Arab 
cultures). The liberal abolishment of the nation state 
is, however, still a progressive and absolutist ideal. For 
the antidote to nationalism and the alternative to the 
nation state is, according to the mainstream liberal 
thinking, a homogenously conceived multiculturalism 
and multiethnicism, a sort of a patchwork world that 
is, however, organized and run efficiently by some 
supranational or superstate structure on which no 
cultural, religious or national tradition as embedded 
in and nurtured by the Atlantic civilization can have 
formative influence. This system is constructed 
according to an abstract dichotomy of individuals 
who care about only their personal identities or are in 
need of protection (liberals and other leftist ideologies, 
including radical socialists and communists differ 
mainly on which groups or what kind of individuals are 
need of protection in the first place), and the unified 
superstructure ruled by the enlightened elite. There 
are no intermediary organizations (NGOs are meant 
to spread and promulgate the ideals of the elite and 
recruit its members), there is no real separation of 
powers, no separation of social roles (not to mention 
hierarchies) and ethical codes; ideally, not only 
separations but also distinctions are eliminated. The 
dictatorial consequences of such objectives and of 
such a world need to be pointed out by conservatives 
relentlessly. 
No wonder that these tendencies and such thinking 
have provoked strong reactions on the far right. 
Though Nazism and the unconstrained exaltation of 
national egoism are still rather unpopular in Europe 
and in the Western world, making the interest of the 
nation first and above any other political principle, 
issue and even the common good is an increasingly 
influential position. It often comes in the form of 
a rejection of globalization, the invisible forces of 
capitalism or the conspiring elites – of the harsh 
criticism of the European Union as an administrative 
and non-elected superstate, and not in an honest 
and sincere defense of the moral and rational 
superiority of the nation-state. However, what lies 
behind these criticisms is usually nothing but the 
nationalization of the global state, the totality 
of local power, the particularistic version of the 
liberal ideal of non-separation, non-distinction and 
the perfect unity of citizens and leaders or elites. 
Needless to say that such regimes have similar 
dictatorial consequences, liable to the criticism of 
conservatives.
There is no chance to return to the world 
of transnational and transcultural empires. 
Conservatives should not take such ideas seriously, 
as they need to be political realists. Yet the criticism 
of both the globalist and the localist or nationalist 
absolutisms does recall and point to the virtues of 
empires, the greatest of which was the prevention 
of dictatorships and totalitarian ideologies and 
regimes. What seems to be still applicable and 
feasible from their practice is the real separation 
of powers, the concern over values of the Atlantic 
civilization and high culture, including aesthetical 
and religious ones, as well as the protection of the 
autonomy of non-state organizations, especially 
those that have deep roots in history and tradition. 
HISTORY AND THE PRESENT
F inally, conservatives face two equally absolutist alternatives with regard to history and historical thinking. The one originates in the traditional 
progressive belief in the future, in the perfectibility of 
mankind, in the utopian unity of all nations. It needs to be 
added that this belief, indeed, faith has usually been held 
in a qualified sense. Mankind has serious challenges to 
face; a concentrated and concerted effort must be made 
to overcome them (such as the climate change); a simple 
mistake may launch a nuclear war threatening ultimate 
destruction and so on. This is, in fact, what justifies the 
promotion of moralism, the search for the magic formula 
of ethics, enlightened democracy, perennial peace and 
happiness secured by a world government. 
The other side is arguing that the Day of Judgment 
is imminent. The decline of Western civilization is 
almost unstoppable, social cohesion is on the verge 
of cessation; demographic tendencies and migration 
will soon bring about the collapse. This argumentation 
is similarly qualified: there are some last chances and 
forces remaining to block the demolition, although 
despair is the reasonable reaction to the modern world. 
Conservatives, once again, stress the historical lessons 
about human nature and human communities that 
have produced the greatest evils and the finest 
personalities of mankind alike. No doubt doomsday 
scenarios cannot be ruled out, and it is true that 
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civilizations can be extinguished or may wane due 
to their inner weaknesses. However, political and 
collective actions aiming at ultimate goals, perfect 
solutions, once-and-for-all turns and the like are 
misguided and contribute to, rather than mitigate, the 
calamities. Hence, grand schemes to save the world 
or the globe by political force need to be avoided. 
Similarly, apocalyptic politics is to be suspected 
because it may easily justify exceptions, states of 
emergencies, the concentration of power to resist 
the enemy and so forth. They are often symptoms of 
weakness rather than sources of strength. In short, 
both totalistic-utopian and apocalyptic-hysterical 
politics and politicians should be sharply criticized 
by conservatives. They need to be sensitive to both 
instincts, responsive to concerns over the future 
and over the past, yet, paradoxically perhaps, they 
ought to be the realists of today, the heroes of the 
present, rather than of the past. They can rely firmly 
on the eternal truths about humanity and the human 
condition; and they do not need to cling either to the 
future or to the past.
CONCLUSION
A s far as I see it, contemporary conservatism needs to be critical of both leftist and rightist ideological aberrations and extremisms. It can 
and must be a voice of moderation in times of crises, 
especially in democracies that are apt to embrace 
extremisms of all kinds all too easily. However, 
conservatism does not need to be exclusively critical. 
In fact, a purely critical stance is always deficient in 
terms of persuasiveness and credibility. Therefore, I 
offered a few constructive points in virtue of which 
conservatives can tell not only what they criticize 
but also why they do so. Conscience is a vitally 
important faculty of human beings. which gives 
them responsibility and autonomy, yet holds them 
accountable efficiently. Conservatives should more 
strongly than ever defend conscience. They should 
also defend the authority of morality but point out 
how it can be abused politically. Since liberals have 
largely abandoned the concept and value of liberty 
as traditionally understood, conservatives have a 
mission to promote it in a meaningful and sensible 
way, protecting it against all sorts of tyrannies. 
Conservatives should, again, speak up for the reality 
of Atlantic civilization and reject both national egoism 
and globalist superstructures. Finally, conservatives 
should focus on the political needs and issues of the 
day, standing firmly on the timeless truths of human 
nature and reject fantasies of a perfect future and the 
hysterical accounts of history alike. 
I have no intention to make practical political 
proposals or make extensive comments on the 
current European political tendencies here. It should 
be sufficient to say that conservatives as principled 
moderates should resist both the onslaught of 
egalitarian, utopian, absolutist thinking and policy 
programs, including those about migration, social 
justice, bureaucratic governance and the seduction 
of authoritarian, power-centred, mystically and 
egoistically nationalistic etatist parties and 
programs. Moreover, there are signs of a sound 
and robust sort of conservative policy getting 
solidified and even popular in Austria, Germany 
and France (notwithstanding the electoral defeat 
of F. Fillon: the dramatically rapid loss of popularity 
of the leftist-liberal E. Macron is a grave warning 
to the left). Even what is called right extremism 
in Scandinavia has – especially in Norway and 
Denmark – come closer to the center. Eastern 
Central European countries have different party 
trajectories, yet moderate conservatism is alive in 
them. Though these parties often have various, 
even strenuous relations to their natural home 
parties. This is certainly true in Hungary where the 
governing party has been increasingly criticized by 
conservatives, myself included, for slipping toward 
the extreme (whereas the Jobbik, a noted extremist 
party, has done enormous efforts to get closer to the 
centre). There is, I conclude, a natural demand for a 
credible and convincing policy of moderation which 
conservatives, unlike mere realists, opportunists, 
politically and intellectually weightless personalities 
can and should advance and represent in a 
principled and philosophically sound way.   •
